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Summary 
 
 
This report outlines a preliminary response from DOE researchers to the 
following three questions: 
 
1  What are the key priorities with regard to cyber security research 
and development over the next decade? 
2.  What would we recommend, in terms of a program, to address 
those priorities? 
3.  How would a DOE Office of Science program in this area 
complement other cybersecurity R&D initiatives such as NSF's or 
other agency programs? 
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About this Report 
 
Dr. Raymond L. Orbach, Under Secretary for Science, U.S. Department of Energy, requested a response 
to three basic questions relating to cyber security: 
1. What are the key priorities with regard to cyber security research and development over the 
next decade? 
2. What would we recommend, in terms of a program, to address those priorities? 
3. How would a DOE Office of Science program in this area complement other cyber security 
research and development initiatives such as National Science Foundation or other agency 
programs? 
A grassroots community of cyber security researchers formed three groups to respond to these questions. 
The results are contained in the three appendixes to this report. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Area A – Science-based Cyber Security 
Research Priorities for the Next Decade 
 
 A.1 
Area A – Science-based Cyber Security Research Priorities  
for the Next Decade 
This paper provides a recommendation for the formation of a five to ten year transformational, forward-
looking Department of Energy (DOE) Cyber Security Research Program, intended to move all of  DOE 
from reactive to proactive and to enable DOE to move ahead of the threats. The paper addresses the 
unique cyber security challenges inherent in DOE’s Open Science and Energy Control Systems 
environments, provides criteria for the focus and direction of research areas, and outlines a research 
program that would address the most significant threats and issues. Four specific thrust areas are 
presented in more detail; these were identified by the security community in a DOE-organized cyber 
security workshop and in subsequent discussions. These thrust areas emphasize the needed R&D in 
understanding security problems in computer systems from a fundamental level, in determining the 
tradeoffs that can be made between usability and security in future architectures, in security awareness 
and response, in human factors, federated trust, for both DOE’s open science programs and energy control 
systems. Our overall conclusion is that such a research program is urgently needed to address DOE’s 
current, emerging and future cyber security requirements. 
Background and Program Objectives 
DOE is responsible for the integrity of the nation’s energy delivery systems, where cyber attacks might 
have extreme consequences to public health & safety and the nation’s economy.  In addition, DOE’s vast 
cyber resources, its high international visibility, its mission, and its open nature renders it a prime target 
for hackers, cyber espionage and cyber terrorism. DOE cyber systems are continually under attack and 
several of DOE’s cyber environments have been compromised, with a very deleterious effect upon 
operations, reputation, and the privacy of its constituents.  
These are areas where the DOE is “behind the curve” in the area of cyber security. An immediate and 
aggressive cyber security program to mitigate all of these problems must be a DOE, if not a national, 
imperative.  
Fortunately, DOE is uniquely well positioned to make a major contribution to solving the nation’s cyber 
security problems through a program of fundamental research. DOE has a reputation, unique among 
federal agencies, in planning and executing large-scale scientific research. DOE and its labs have 
conceived and executed programs that have made major contributions in fundamental and applied physics, 
biology (including the Human Genome Project), chemistry, computer science (pioneering the terascale), 
materials science, and many others. An aggressive research program will not only address DOE’s needs, 
but also advance the state of this critical art to the benefit of the nation. According to a recent report from 
the National Research Council and the National Engineering Academy, “… a secure cyberspace is vitally 
important to the nation … but the United States faces real risks that adversaries will exploit vulnerabilities 
… causing considerable suffering and damage.” [NRC-2007] 
The threats to different parts of the DOE complex are as diverse as the agency’s mission, and improving 
cyber security is a complex, daunting task. DOE’s open science environment poses special challenges.  
Some of the unique factors pertinent to DOE’s open science mission are: 1) access is required to 
extremely valuable, centralized resources, 2) emphasis is on “big science” that can be at unprecedented 
scales in exceedingly complex, and sometimes multi-national environments, 3) users are numerous and 
highly decentralized among diverse IT settings, many of which are not well secured, 4) legacy systems 
are pervasive elements of the environment. Besides open science, the DOE mission has classified 
components requiring even higher levels of protection.  
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When cyber security incidents occur, they tend to be tremendously disruptive to the operational 
environment, they can besmirch DOE’s reputation for operating trusted environments, and remediation 
can be extremely expensive. At the same time DOE has significant programs of unclassified international 
research requiring secure participation in world-wide collaborations. Malicious alteration or deletion of 
data could significantly impede scientific progress or cast doubt on the outcomes of experiments, but 
inappropriately restrictive security controls might cause DOE participation to be shunned. Furthermore, 
DOE has some unique cyber security requirements because its research projects are at the leading edge of 
technological possibility. Consequently, DOE will experience some cyber security issues and challenges 
distinct from the commercial sector, requiring solutions before they become commercially relevant. This 
combination of factors makes DOE unique in its cyber security needs, demanding fundamentally new 
approaches. 
Immediate efforts are needed not only in securing DOE information systems, but also in developing 
advanced methods and concepts to secure and sustain the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring that it 
remains among the most robust, reliable, secure, and technologically advanced in the world. Improving 
the security of energy control systems is a crucial requirement to protect our national energy delivery 
infrastructure. 
This call to action augments and distills both the discussions that took place at the "Cyber R&D Planning 
Meeting” on October 17, 2007, in Washington, DC, and the Cyber Security Research Needs for Open 
Science Workshop Report that was the culmination of the DOE workshop held July 23–24, 2007 in 
Bethesda, Maryland, sponsored jointly by the Office of Science and the Office of Electricity Delivery and 
Energy Reliability [DOE-CS-Report]. That report identified seven comprehensive thrust areas for long-
term cyber security research. During subsequent meetings at Sandia, at the SC’07 conference in Reno, 
and in Washington DC, several more complementary research areas have surfaced. This report distills 
those areas into four specific research programs targeted to address DOE’s most critical cyber security 
needs. 
This proposed program would create a proactive and forward-looking approach to research and 
development in the cyber security area from a rigorous analytical and technical basis that would stimulate 
new open science research directions and have a lasting impact on cyber security. The intent is for the 
program to be transformational as well as visionary – to move our cyber security capabilities beyond 
traditional “catch and patch” reaction to a proactive posture. It is crucial that the research establish a firm 
scientific foundation and allows broad participation of researchers, whether or not they have clearances. 
The output of this open program is intended to contain many elements also usable by classified enclaves 
and power delivery control. Fortunately, DOE has resources and expertise that render it uniquely capable 
of contributing to such a research agenda, including the world’s most advanced computing platforms, 
operational environments for initial deployment at the largest scale, and unparalleled expertise embedded 
in its human resource base. 
Research Program Criteria 
A DOE cyber security research program should, on a regular basis, evaluate predictions about the relevant 
technologies five to ten years out and derive the associated cyber security needs and requirements. A gap 
analysis of the R&D programs in other agencies and industry will allow DOE to define a focused, 
directed R&D program to ensure the future security requirements of DOE and the nation will be 
addressed properly.  
These decisions should be based on a risk analysis by considering the consequences of a future in which 
DOE does not have the tools and technologies required to address the predicted cyber security challenges. 
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In other words, DOE’s program should not substantially duplicate nor compete with research in other 
agencies and industry, but complement those efforts to ensure that DOE's particular requirements are in 
focus. Just as DOE’s advanced science projects are often years ahead of common adoption by industry 
and society, the solutions to DOE’s particular cyber security requirements may benefit society at large at 
a later stage. For the same reason, DOE will also accumulate unique expertise and capabilities in the 
advanced cyber security related research areas. Part of the R&D agenda and program should include 
methodologies by which these solutions can be transitioned to the larger community – providing 
additional benefit to the nation. 
By setting targets five to ten years in the future, we will identify research areas and directions that will 
have a strong science orientation as opposed to a purely applied engineering effort. Many existing 
research programs and investments emphasize near-term solutions. While these are important, a focus on 
six- to twelve-month outcomes draws attention from the longer-term research needs and tends to lead to 
incremental rather than transformational change. Another difficulty in existing research programs is the 
tendency to fund research without including a path towards eventual deployment. Unless science 
outcomes are infused into the cyber security field in a usable ways, the problems they were intended to 
address will remain. Therefore, a transformational cyber security research program that focuses on 
longer-term goals, considers the investments of other agencies and industry, and operates in such a way 
that the science can be translated into solutions that can be applied, is necessary. 
Cyber Security Defense Taxonomy 
It is useful to categorize the elements of end-to-end architectures and the higher-level aspects that must be 
protected in a cyber security environment, so as to ensure that the domain is covered in an effective way. 
Such a categorization will facilitate aggregating research directions into the aforementioned focused areas 
to result in a coherent and consolidated cyber security defense R&D program. Figure 1 shows a taxonomy 
for this purpose, beginning at lower levels with hardware components and extending upwards to 
culminate in data and information. Note that cyber security can and should be implemented at each of the 
levels shown and in many cases, across the boundaries shown in the figure. Moreover, the areas of 
Middleware and Users cut across all elements, even extending down into hardware components. 
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Figure 1. Cyber security taxonomy 
Research and Development Focus Areas 
The thrust areas from the workshop that are most pertinent to and perhaps even unique in DOE’s Open 
Science and Energy Control Systems environments should be the focus of an initial research and 
development program. Specifically, these are areas where DOE has both unique needs due to the scale 
and nature of its environments and unique capabilities evidenced in its mission. Indeed, these are areas 
where DOE can make the most significant and most enduring cyber security research contributions. 
Securing the design and operational integrity of the exascale computing enterprises of the future is by 
definition an exascale challenge. Cyber security science and technologies must keep pace with evolving 
computing architectures developed if there is a hope to sustain scalable open computing resources and the 
nation’s energy delivery infrastructure. 
A number of research areas will be essential to both the DOE’s open science and classified cyber security 
needs. We anticipate that a more comprehensive evaluation of focus areas will result from a series of both 
classified and open workshops, and forums that we recommend be held beginning in early 2008. However, 
we have identified four areas as critical topics and expand upon these in this section. These areas are: 
• Open Science security architecture for an exascale future 
• multi-layer security understanding, awareness and response 
• human aspects/factors & federated trust 
• intrinsically secure control of critical systems. 
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Open Science Security Architecture for an Exascale Future 
To make significant progress in the miasma of cyber security, it is categorically apparent that cyber 
security must be built into systems from the ground up. This, in fact, may be the most important cyber 
security research direction that emerged from the workshop; the theme continued at the October meeting 
in a discussion of the importance of intrinsically secure or inherently secure computing. Thus, new 
architectures containing new hardware (e.g., TPM+ chips) need to be designed to include  
• embedded cyber security monitoring and processing capabilities (e.g., on-board or peripheral 
cyber security processing virtualized architectures) 
• hardware and software design to accommodate new cyber security analytics (e.g. processors 
designed for ultra-fast data comparison and analysis encompassing searches, sorts, merges, joins 
and pattern recognition) 
• new encryption and decryption techniques.  
Multi-core capability and field programmable gate array (FPGA) processing offer promise in this regard. 
DOE has unique, ultra-large-scale hardware platforms and associated expertise that provide the 
environment for processing at the required rates in DOE’s environment. This research would apply at the 
lower levels of the cyber security taxonomy, involve interdisciplinary work between computer scientists 
(to include cyber security researchers), and should include close collaboration with hardware and 
operating system vendors. 
Current developments in virtualization technologies will facilitate system management and deployment 
by enabling new service-based architectures that enable autonomic and self-healing systems. However, 
these advances will cause paradigm shifts in the way we deploy resources (Gartner Data Center 
conference: “…virtualization will be the most ‘impactful’ infrastructure and operations technology 
through 2012…”[Gartner-Virtualization]), and the implications on the security policy enforcement are far 
from clear. DOE, as an early adopter of many of these new technologies for computers, databases and 
networks, will have to understand the security impacts of new virtual machine technologies before the 
private sector. Furthermore, DOE can expect such virtual machine technologies to evolve into the 
management components of the power grid infrastructure, where it will also impact security policy 
enforcement. An interim approach would entail a development effort to deploy portions of legacy systems 
to address these evolving threats and needs. A follow-on, longer-term approach is to design security 
processing directly into systems from the ground up. 
One additional concern is an expected increase in system complexity by orders of magnitude, as DOE’s 
projects continue to push the limits of Moore’s law and embrace ever-larger numbers of processors and 
embedded sensors. Our current management and policy tools are unable to cope with the increase of the 
number of entities whose lifecycle have to be managed while the correct security policies are enforced on 
each interaction. Virtualization technologies add additional complications as resources become ephemeral, 
are replicated, and physically are moved around. Further research is needed into architectures that include 
policy-enforcing frameworks that present administrators with human-friendly abstractions while 
automating and correctly enforcing interaction policies of the myriad of affected components. Certainly, 
as part of this research area, an essential aspect is R&D on more efficient crypto algorithms and crypto 
hardware solutions to ensure integrity of DOE’s networks, data, and communications infrastructure. 
The threats posed by hacker communities, the malware industry, and foreign political adversaries will 
only become more sophisticated and malignant [Schneier-10Year, Gutmann-Malware]. Research into 
how to better use virtualization technologies could yield tools that allow  
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• a finer grained access control enforcement of the physical resources like data and network 
• the deployment of service appliances on thinner, feature-free, more secure operating systems 
• transparent encryption of local file systems 
• the trusted computing base (TCB) to extend to virtual appliances where application secrets and 
keys can be moved and processed.  
Many of those possible applications are transformative: they allow us to break away from our current 
dependencies on popular but flawed operating systems and change the paradigm of what we consider to 
be our desktop and server. 
Multi-level Security Understanding, Awareness, and Response  
Cyber security today is primarily defensive, largely reactive, and labor intensive. System providers and 
attackers engaged in an unending “arms race,” with exploits and countermeasures in an endless cycle of 
co-evolution. Threats and vulnerabilities are defined and addressed only after they emerge, are then 
isolated, analyzed, and distilled into specific findings for which exact-matching is required for 
determination. Adversaries have adapted to these detection techniques by encrypting or randomizing 
content, employing large proxy servers as destinations (rendering most all destinations both good and bad 
in order to frustrate IP-blocking) and have adapted to the modern network security practice of disallowing 
services on unusual ports by "tunneling" malicious command traffic and data exfiltration within the 
standard service protocols. Progress in such a cycle is incremental and invariably temporary; thus notions 
of assurance or quantitative risk assessment are short-lived and fragile. More flexible and intelligent 
"behavior-profile-based" detection methods are needed. 
Concurrently, DOE information systems are distributed and based on commercial technologies from 
hardware and firmware through middleware and application software, with each interdependent layer 
introducing potential for vulnerability. Likewise, mission-critical hardware and software systems for 
energy and other critical infrastructures have become increasingly complex and rely extensively on 
commodity hardware and software components. The DOE carries out its science mission through 
multidisciplinary teams comprising employees, contractors, and collaborators from other agencies, 
universities, and countries with a variety of security postures and interests that are not always aligned. 
Similarly, the information resources that agency teams require are located both within the DOE complex 
and at multiple laboratories. The complexity and scale of this infrastructure is such that component or 
systematic failures—software errors, human errors, security vulnerabilities—are inevitable. This is 
particularly true given the high reliance on commercial components, each of which is managed via a 
constant series of updates and patches to address the latest vulnerabilities. Today’s information systems 
are inherently distributed and complex much like an ecosystem—failures in such systems are the steady 
state, not the exception. Security architecture must address the steady state. 
Similarly, the information resources that agency teams require are located both within the DOE complex 
and at multiple laboratories. The complexity and scale of this infrastructure is such that component or 
systematic failures—software errors, human errors, security vulnerabilities—are inevitable. This is 
particularly true given the high reliance on commercial components, each of which is managed via a 
constant series of updates and patches to address the latest vulnerabilities. Today’s information systems 
are inherently distributed and complex much like an ecosystem—failures in such systems are the steady 
state, not the exception. Security architecture must address the steady state. 
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A scientific approach, examining fundamental assumptions and architectures, is necessary in order to 
transform cybersecurity into a proactive discipline. Such an approach has the promise to deliver systems 
that are capable of anticipating and effectively addressing vulnerabilities that arise from the inevitable 
human, hardware, and software failures endemic to complex systems. Consequently, a science-driven 
approach to security must focus on understanding and awareness that inform response. Benefits of a 
science-driven approach to security include better understanding and quantification of risk, improvement 
in the ability of system components to detect and respond to failure or potential vulnerabilities, and an 
overall information architecture that provides security and assurance. 
Security awareness constitutes the abilites to 1) understand the current state of the elements that make up 
a security domain, including systems, objects, humans, and data, 2) infer the general security level of the 
domain by combining the individual state information, and 3) develop response and containment actions 
based on the level of domain security. The special needs in DOE’s open science environment make 
addressing the security awareness properly through research a difficult problem. The open science 
environment is complex: researchers from autonomous security domains collaborate, share access to 
remote instruments and resources, and move enormous data sets across different laboratories and even 
countries. Thus, elements that affect the security of a domain are spread throughout several autonomous 
domains. For example, a malicious user who has broken into a security domain may be detected by using 
local monitoring and detection tools. However, the local tools become ineffective in alerting and 
informing other security domains against the attacker, yet the active participation of these other domains 
may be necessary to thwart the activity. Even more difficult, proactive approaches such as active 
intervention and elimination of the threat may require cooperation as well; how this can be accomplished 
is not yet understood. Although there is ongoing research in this area, existing approaches are limited to 
the perspective of a single domain. The challenge we face in DOE’s open science environment is the fact 
that we live in a collaborative and open environment, and thus must interoperate across multiple, 
autonomous and heterogeneous security domains.  
An aspect of this research area focuses on managing and creating security awareness and the capability to 
respond (or proactively intervene) for open science environments at several different levels: 1) the 
network level by focusing on intrusion detection and denial of service tolerance, 2) the system level by 
analyzing the human actions on systems and on state changes of system objects, 3) data level by 
analyzing and characterizing the data sets, linking the dots, and enabling security-data sharing 4) the 
human level by creating a trusted link between and among human operators and automated tools. 
Characterization of human threats using signatures to facilitate early warning and detection and 
predictions also can trigger actionable behaviors to mitigate vulnerabilities. 
Security awareness is not limited to inferring the current domain security, but also taking appropriate 
response for a change in the domain security. This would require automated response and containment 
tools that can eliminate human intervention in order to reduce response time. Continuing with the above 
example, after a security domain is attacked, the other domains that may be affected must be 
automatically informed about the attack so that they could prevent access from this attacker. The security 
awareness techniques described above each play a role in this scenario to detect a threat proactively. The 
response and containment research enriches security awareness by ensuring that appropriate security 
mechanisms are in place ahead of or just in time. The challenges in this area are numerous: scale, speed, 
and multi-domain nature. New techniques in machine learning, control theory and group dynamics are 
needed for this research direction.  
A portion of this research area should be devoted to development of a flexible modeling and simulation 
(M&S) test-bed capability to understand impacts and gain insights about the usability of policies on 
systems used for open science and open science practices, the development of methods and metrics to 
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assess audit policy implementation for correctness and usefulness, and the development of observable 
human system and network behavior signatures as early warning offensive and defensive indicators of 
vulnerabilities. This M&S capability would be proactive in nature, for example addressing how proposed 
policies impacts security usability prior to their implementation as mandates in real world operational 
contexts.  
Usable security is an emerging research field, and was explicitly highlighted in [NRC-07] as a critical 
technology for promoting deployment of security technologies; participation in this area of research will 
be increasingly important to DOE in the future. 
Human Aspects & Factors and Federated Trust 
“In the Bentham calculus of protecting our systems, networks and data, the user is often forgotten, 
ignored, or even neglected, sometimes profoundly affecting productivity and impeding open science 
discoveries.” - from the Human Factors session of the Workshop. 
Painful experience has indicated that human factors are often the weakest link in any cyber security 
environment. DOE is unique in this aspect of its Open Science environment. Users of DOE open science 
systems are vast in number, exist in highly distributed, unverified cyber environments, and have access to 
extremely costly, unparalleled resources. This environment represents the “perfect storm” of challenges in 
the area of cyber security. Nowhere is the need greater for improved access, control, and cyber security 
than in DOE’s Open Science environment.  
New, quantifiable trust frameworks and the tools to model, simulate, and analyze trust in open science 
environments must be explored, devised, implemented, tested, and refined. Cost-risk-benefit analyses for 
cyber security trust must also be developed, tested, implemented, optimized, and periodically refreshed to 
address threats and vulnerabilities as they continue to evolve and emerge. The research must address the 
challenges of an open science community that exists in a highly decentralized environment, involving 
many sites, each with different policies and infrastructures for trust. New cyber security discoveries 
include novel techniques for trust negotiation among systems and users. Some of the common research 
elements in this area are the development of a quantitative tool for assessing trust, development of 
assessment and profiling tools to duplicate or simulate environments upon which security may be 
implemented and tested, and development of techniques for evaluating and fine tuning how trust and 
security policy can best be implemented in multiple, distributed, complex systems and architectures.  
The challenges involve extending trust across levels of the taxonomy and maintaining cyber security 
when transitioning among virtual environments. Better, smarter federated systems for authenticating users 
and authorizing access to varying classes of DOE assets will facilitate secure access to DOE assets. It 
might, for example, be a policy that protected Personally Identifiable Information (PII) be stored only 
once, at a user’s home location, in encrypted form, and never be exchanged with or stored on DOE 
systems. This would limit identity theft and preserve privacy, but requires a new model for a web of trust 
to be developed and implemented. A research program in this area will encompass both legacy via 
existing webs of trust and new systems via emerging webs of trust. DOE is uniquely positioned both in its 
need for solutions in this area and its environment for defining, deploying, testing and refining solutions 
in this area. 
Areas in which new cyber security discoveries are required include novel techniques for user privilege 
negotiation among systems, user authentication, user authorization, and possibly remote configuration of 
cyber resources in decentralized environments. The benefits of this research will be better cyber security, 
easier accessibility to DOE resources, and distribution of the effort required to implement cyber security, 
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allowing the burden of user enrollment and authentication to be assumed mostly by the users’ home sites, 
rather than solely on the broad shoulders of DOE. The research is expected to take 3 to 5 years for initial 
efforts (federated authentication and authorization), and 5 to 7 years for federated dynamic configuration 
and management in remote environments. All areas of the cyber security taxonomy, especially users and 
middleware, are involved, and new approaches and algorithms from the field of computer science will be 
required. New software and possibly hardware also are expected to result from this research.  
Intrinsically Secure Control of Critical Systems 
DOE and its laboratories have a responsibility to ensure that critical systems are controlled in a secure 
manner. DOE has a responsibility (shared with the Department of Homeland Security) to ensure that 
systems critical to meeting our nation’s energy needs (including power generators, electrical grids, 
pipelines, and refineries) can be made secure from attacks, including cyber attacks. DOE also has a 
special responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons, which it designs and produces, are secure from 
attack and misuse. 
Much of the proposed security research is applicable to both of these areas as well as to open science and 
will be tested, productized, and implemented in these environments that have their own unique 
implementation nuances. Indeed, much of the cyber security research should be conducted in liaison with 
the Office of Science, the National Nuclear Security Agency, and the Office of Electricity Delivery and 
Energy Reliability, so as to realize maximum benefit and quickest time to deployment in these critical 
sectors. Since control systems in general, and energy control systems in particular, are often integrated 
with information networks, joint investigation of vulnerabilities and research to mitigate them is critical. 
Several areas of the proposed research are applicable to control systems where the impact of system 
failure or a breach of security would have far-reaching national and international consequences. In 
particular, template architectures for control systems including models of survivability, designs for 
graceful failure (controlled degradation), and improved support for human intervention are imperative. 
The research challenges are numerous, including: the distributed, heterogeneous nature of systems and 
system components; how to quantify, measure, and evaluate survivability and trustworthiness with 
respect to cyber and physical threats; how to identify and prioritize failure and degradation; the 
requirement to maintain a high level of service during an energy systems incident; and the need to avoid 
high-consequence failures (nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants). 
Other areas of the proposed program address the gathering, logging, distilling, anonymizing, and sharing 
of threat data. Control systems involve a multitude of private sector and public sector organizations, many 
of which are not motivated to take preemptive precautions due to return on investment constraints. The 
research challenges are numerous, including 
• the distributed, heterogeneous nature of systems and system components 
• how to quantify, measure, and evaluate robustness with respect to cyber and physical threats 
• how to identify and prioritize incident response, including factors of cost 
• how to quantify and predict responses to operator interaction 
• how to enforce cyber security in the face of real-time requirements 
• the requirement to maintain a high level of service during an incident.  
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Conclusion & Next Steps 
DOE’s cyber security workshop in July 2007 resulted in broad recommendations for a research program. 
The authors of this white paper strongly concur with those findings and believe that a progressive cyber 
security program is urgently needed to address DOE’s cyber security requirements over the next five to 
ten years. The workshop report enumerated a number of specific thrust areas for the program, while 
subsequent discussions have added additional complementary topics; an important subset of which is 
presented in this paper. All these findings provide an excellent starting point for the actual realization of a 
focused DOE Cyber Security R&D Program, and we offer energy, commitment, and assistance in the 
process to bring such a program to fruition. 
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Area B: Structure and Components 
There can be no question that securing cyberspace is of the utmost priority; it is not even a matter of 
trying to act pre-emptively because the attacks are daily, growing in number, and growing in 
sophistication every day. The nation in general relies on computers and the Internet for everything from 
simulation to control. DOE, in addition to information on the newest advances in science and technology, 
controls a stockpile of nuclear weapons data; its vulnerability is correspondingly greater and more critical. 
Significant resources need to be committed to the defense of our cyber-resources and the protection of our 
computing assets, we also need to develop a serious, long-term, and broad program to build the 
foundation for continued security. In this paper, we will address these needs and propose a structure to 
manage and advance such a cyber-security program.  
1. Purpose 
a. Cyber security: Cyber security has many facets, from protecting computers and data 
from theft and attack to ensuring that time and resources are not bound up in unsolicited 
or dangerous material. We need to cover all bases without interfering with ease of use or 
erecting barriers to sharing and learning that only hamper legitimate work while offering 
little or no protection from organized attackers. Speed bumps and stop signs on the 
information superhighway will only bother the user and never affect the determined 
intruder.  
b. Secure resources: When the Internet was first conceived, few could foresee the 
immense opportunities for mischief, much less malevolence. Cybercrime is so 
widespread and takes so many forms that users are becoming wary of using the resources 
even as many applications migrate to the net for convenience. We need to develop means 
for making use of the network more secure and reliable, and thus make users more 
confident.  
c. Maintain open computing and classified computing Cyber security takes on an 
added dimension when applied to the DOE with its mix of open computing and classified 
work, with its need to use the best scientists and engineers, regardless of citizenship in 
the open, and the concurrent need to provide the cleared scientists with the best and best 
protected resources. Open computing and open source software is useful for rapid and 
multi-perspective improvement, but it also exposes all of the flaws and weaknesses for 
those whose job it is to find backdoors. Balancing these needs, these conflicting priorities 
must be the primary consideration in the design of this program. And, so shall we make it 
our top priority. 
d. Build sustainable infrastructure: Cyber security is not a matter of patching, but a 
long term effort to establish trust and to limit if not prevent unauthorized usage while not 
hampering legitimate work nor escalating minor use infractions into time consuming 
incident reports. 
2. Goal  
a.  Matrix, not pipeline: It is widely believed that research and development define a 1 
dimensional continuum from pure theory at one end and deployment–engineering at the 
other. While this view has merit, it is more informative to consider science and 
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application as orthogonal dimensions, as in Fig.1. To deepen the resource pool for cyber 
security, this second view has definite advantages. It increases the flexibility of lines of 
communication and establishes a structure without setting up hierarchy or competing 
value systems. In the linear mapping, some derive comfort in staying in the science end, 
while others prefer to reside in the product area at the other end. The multidimensional 
view increases the opportunities for interaction and permits greater flexibility in planning. 
The DARPA programs are based on the more old-fashioned idea-to-product pipeline 
model; it does deliver products, but the science and foundations are abandoned with each 
product and do not become part of an infrastructure or a an institutional resource. With a 
problem as important and protean as cyber security, we cannot afford this narrow view. 
Pure applied 
research 
(Edison)
Pure basic 
research 
(Bohr)
Use-inspired 
basic 
research 
(Pasteur)
No
Yes
No
Yes
Consideration of use?
Quest for 
fundamental 
understanding?
Research is 
inspired by:
 
Figure 1.  The Research Matrix 
(Adapted from Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation, Stokes 1997.) 
b.  Broad Science Basis: Cyber security is not just a matter of plugging holes or building 
walls; it touches upon every aspect of computer design, technology, social behaviors, 
knowledge discovery and management, and user awareness and education. The DOE 
program must not only nurture work in judicious proportion across a wide spectrum of 
sciences, it must help to develop a strong infrastructure that will organize the various 
thrusts and establish standards for professionalism, education and credentials, most likely 
in connection with a fellowship program like that in High Performance Computing. The 
SciDAC program provides an excellent template for the construction of a broad yet end-
directed research program that meets the needs of the DOE while advancing science in 
the most fundamental manner without sacrificing security. 
c. Integrate bidirectionally front line ↔ research: Instead of the DARPA model 
where a single grant would cover a project from idea to delivery, the proposed Cyber 
Security research program will let groups maintain their specialization and focus, relying 
on the program infrastructure for hand-offs and interaction. The program management 
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will be key to the success, serving as messenger, guide, planner, reviewer, and most 
importantly, recruiter–advocate. The best example would be the aptly named “technology 
evangelist” at Apple. 
d. Balance the competing needs of open science with the secrecy demanded by 
the adversarial nature of cyber security. We must realize that all work that touches 
on cyber security is under close scrutiny from those who wish to breach our systems. The 
tension between the discussion and sharing so essential to good science and the need to 
keep not only results but also priorities and research needs closely held is not new; the 
mathematics and cryptography communities have long realized the problem. It would be 
naïve and wrong to ignore this issue in the design of a comprehensive open science 
research program for cyber security. For this reason especially, we will advocate 
deviating from the SciDAC model to include extra groups to review and guide the 
research. 
e. Act as a proving ground or testbed for best practices in cyber security. We 
hope that one of the fruits of this program will be to establish a high standard for 
computer use and protection that will have wide general use and acceptance. More so 
than the scientific goals of SciDAC or the overall DOE commitment to greater 
acceptance of supercomputing, the research and results that will arise from this program 
will be of immense value to every aspect of internet and computer use. We hope to lead 
by example as much as by report in this critical fight. 
3. Priority Research Directions and Management Timeline 
The Priority Research Directions (PRDs) are if nothing else, comprehensive; yet like all lists, a simple 
enumeration fails to capture the true topology of the cyber security space. It is vital that we not 
splinter or stovepipe the research so early in the game; by acting as a centralized funding mechanism, 
this program should also function as a clearinghouse and forum, increasing collaboration and cross-
pollination as often and as actively as possible, via meetings and the direct contact of the program 
managers with each other and the wider community of research and systems administrators manning 
the front lines of the cyber security struggle. Because of the somewhat unique need for keeping data 
and methods internal that comes with all cyber security research, we cannot accept leaks from this 
program any more than we can accept them from the data we are trying to protect. It is all too obvious 
that hackers, both freelance and state-sponsored share knowledge of exploits and vulnerabilities; we 
must take care not to make it easier for them to learn of our methods and interests. Page rankings and 
spam detection rules are closely held; this program should be no less careful to protect its intellectual 
assets from prying eyes and roving bots.  
a. Taxonomy–ontology of needs: The first goal must be to show the true and complex 
structure of the needs and research thrusts of cyber security. And, not in merely the sense 
of taxonomy and ontology, but also in view of the program managers and advisory panels. 
One of the strengths of the community is its breadth and size. We must coordinate this 
deep pool of intellectual capital and harness it to the task at hand. The obvious parallel is 
the Manhattan Project with its calculated mix of brilliant theorists and proficient 
experimental scientists.  
b. Project Centered Management: Management, always key to the success a program, 
plays a greater than usual role here. Unlike most other scientific endeavors, the landscape 
here is constantly shifting, more like a chess tournament than a puzzler. Management 
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must take responsibility for harvesting and sharing information, for forging links across 
disciplines and projects and for guiding research as needed. After all, the structure of the 
program is essentially that of the management infrastructure, and thus, it is they who will 
be most able to push the program from successful to exemplary.  
c. Rolling 1, 2, 5 year plans: The constantly morphing nature of the cyber security 
threats demand a commensurate flexibility in timelines, grants, and levels of effort. Some 
of the more successful goal directed research programs have been based on rolling near-
,mid- and long- term goals; it seems appropriate to emphasize this for the cyber security 
effort. Likewise, there have been programs that have made the potential of a team nearly 
as important as the actual work proposed, realizing that changes in direction and scope 
can be cued from without as well as within. Cyber security needs to incorporate a wide 
variety of interests. 
d. Handoffs, phase-outs, startups. The flip side of a flexible time line is the realization 
by all involved that project and work efforts have a lifetime and a life-cycle. The program 
should take an active role at all stages of development; as some projects spin down, plans 
should be made so that the knowledge is not lost, the resources not archived, the skills not 
buried.  
4. Communications 
If the program structure and management are designated as the chief communicators within the 
program, one cannot downplay the need for multidirectional communications. In situations where 
some information must be closely held and some widely shared, it will naturally fall to the 
managers to impose discretion as needed and to inform as desired. The pipelines should include: 
upstream from researcher (both current and putative) to management, downstream from users and 
management to project leads, including feedback to guide, not just assess progress, and most 
importantly, across projects. 
5. Documentation 
Some of the communications will be oral and interpersonal (see above), but the bulk of the visible 
results will be in papers, both peer-reviewed and status reports. In the fast paced universe of cyber 
security, timeliness is a paramount virtue. We also favor a new measure of full disclosure to 
inform the community of both successes and roadblocks. In that spirit, every effort should be 
made to regularly update the priorities and roster of promising avenues. For the sake of security 
in all senses of the word, some of this information will be publicly posted, while others will exist 
in a more secure form. 
6. Open vs Closely-Held vs Classified 
Cyber security is not to be restricted to protecting the classified data of the DOE and the critical 
infrastructure; we are all at risk of crippling attacks by both the merely malicious and the 
dedicated agent. Under this unified but partitioned umbrella, we should design a program that 
attacks common problems in a unified manner while leaving room for handling special needs and 
special situations. There are many surrogate problems that can be presented to the open research 
community that will in no way compromise or even inform enemies of our plans and status. We 
suggest once again joining in with industry and the general internet community in solving 
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problems of common interest using analogous data sets which come from the outside but present 
many of the same features and problems that we encounter. 
7. Infrastructure: As Important as Research 
One further difference between this proposed program and SciDAC-like programs is that first and 
foremost this program is aimed at moving the results of research into actual implementation and 
deployment. To do so means developing an infrastructure for software and systems that will allow 
for testing and proving and, later, plug and play. Allowance and support for the development of 
such an infrastructure must be an integral and vital part of the program, along with a suite of 
calibrated test sets and scenarios.  
8. Conclusion 
The goal of this program is to place the study of cyber security on a firm and scientific footing, 
and to forge a community of disparate elements united by a common goal through a strong, well 
funded and consistent research program. 
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Area C – Overview of Synergistic Programs and 
Research Directions for the Department of Energy 
Introduction 
The computer science research community has been actively engaged in cyber security research 
for the past 30 years. In the past five years, there has been a flurry of computer security research 
owing to the “importance of cyberspace to nearly all aspects of national life” [NRC-2007]. Some 
of these research agendas are being set based on internal agency needs and missions, others on 
general research needs identified by the community, while still others are based on documents 
outlining sweeping programs, such as the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [White House 
2003]. Additional reports on research emphasis areas have been developed over recent years, 
including the NITRD Cyber Security and Information Assurance Working Group report, Federal 
Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development; and PITAC 
Report to the President: Cyber Security a Crisis of Prioritization. Presently, cyber-security 
research is being actively sponsored by all of the major U.S. funding agencies. DOE has unique 
cyber security requirements that are not currently met by existing R&D or commercial activities, 
and unique talents that speak to the ability of the agency to devise a transformational research 
program. As that path is explored, it will be important to ensure that the DOE R&D program 
complements existing programs, and is in collaboration with and leverages other agencies (and 
research). To that end, this document summarizes some of the agencies and programs that should 
be considered. We incorporate this both in narrative form in the next section, and tabular 
summary in the Crosswalk Table to be provided in a separate document. 
An important consideration for this program is the need for both classified and open aspects of 
the research. As discussed in the DOE Cyber Summit held at Sandia, some elements of threat 
identification cannot be discussed in full detail except within environments that are appropriately 
secured. However, advancement of cyber security research as a whole, and specifically for the 
open science activities within DOE, requires employment of the broadest possible research 
community. It is therefore critical to provide mechanisms for transitioning research questions 
(and some outcomes) from the classified community into the open community, as well as for 
transitioning the open community results into the classified realm, for protection of those 
systems. We recommend continued discussion in this area early in 2008, and this report includes 
a summary of some of the questions that should be considered. 
 
Furthermore, a vehicle is needed to provide support for transitioning scientific advancements into 
general use. Too often, good research is performed but does not enter into practice. This occurs 
for many reasons: lack of sufficient market to support commercial development, lack of sufficient 
depth in an area (the research may be exploratory only), large scale problems that require 
numerous researchers working together for long periods of time, and lack of availability of test 
data to permit examination of theories. The DOE R&D program should consider the need to 
transition science into practice, and support very large scale research efforts as well as smaller 
ones. 
 
Using the Cyber Security R&D Crosswalk Table, one can identify areas of common interest 
addressed across funding agencies and sponsors, as well as those areas that are gaps. Gaps 
emerge for many reasons; sometimes these occur because a given research need is unique to 
specific mission space or agency’s requirements. Alternatively, they can emerge when an agency 
has a different perspective on the need or performance requirements (e.g., many agencies invest 
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in improving performance, but the sensitivity of the instrumentation in DOE is unique, making 
the performance needs more stringent). It is recommended that early in 2008 the research 
emphasis areas identified by the development of a DOE Office of Science R&D Roadmap/Vision 
be reviewed in the context of the broad view of activities conducted and evaluated by other 
organizations. A consensus view of the gaps from these two different perspectives will be 
important to establishing a program that is both complementary and relevant to the DOE, and 
would be helpful in identifying partners. 
 Synergistic Programs 
This section outlines several programs that have made longstanding investments in cyber security 
research. It includes examples of many existing programs, though it is not intended to be 
comprehensive. A wide variety of agencies are involved in these programs: 
 
• National Security Foundation (open research) 
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (open and classified) 
• Office of Naval Research (open and classified) 
• Intelligence Community (IC) and Other Department of Defense (DOD) (open and 
classified) 
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (open and classified) 
 
These programs range from basic science to applied research. Some of the programs have strong 
classified programs as well as open programs (and in those cases details have been removed for 
this unclassified report). DOE researchers are frequently either participants or cognizant of these 
programs, and those relationships will assist in coordinating between them.  
 
The character of the research produced by these agencies varies considerably, and the nature of 
the relationship that a DOE program might have with each varies as well. For example, an agency 
focused on basic research teamed with an agency focused on deploying applications would be an 
ideal partnership to create new knowledge and rapidly convert that knowledge to hardware and 
software in the field.We recommend that a variety of interactions be considered and explored 
early in 2008, so that the DOE program can be focused on DOE missions, effective in outcome, 
and integrated with other efforts.  
A discussion of individual (example) programs follows. 
National Science Foundation (NSF) 
The primary funding vehicle for cyber-security research at NSF is the Cyber Trust Initiative, 
Program Solicitation 07-500. Cyber Trust has focused on research related to security at the 
operating system level and at the user level (including human-computer interaction research to 
improve security). Cyber Trust has also investigated secure routing, and trustworthy wireless 
network security. Additionally, extensive research is being done on formal methods, network 
intrusion detection, denial of service mitigation and worm/bot-net propagation. Finally, there is a 
small group of researchers investigating the intersection of economics and network security.  
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NSF Center Funding and Other Large Scale Efforts 
 NSF Cyber security projects also include center-level investments, such as TCIP (Trustworthy 
Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid), TRUST (Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure 
Technology), and STIM (Security through Interaction Modeling). There is additional NSF 
investment in joint industry–university alliances and REU (Research Experience for 
Undergraduates) programs. NSF grants tend to focus on basic research. An additional opportunity 
for NSF collaborations may involve the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) 
program. Town hall meetings called to investigate GENI have included discussion of security 
requirements, and ability to support security research [GENI-2006]. The GENI town hall meeting 
forums, which were facilitated by NSF and the Computing Research Association, are potential 
models for DOE program development. 
Cyber physical Calls within NSF 
Other related recent NSF calls include Software for Real World Systems (SRS), NSF 07-599; 
Cyber Enabled Discovery and Innovation (CDI), NSF 07-603; Emerging Frontiers in Research 
and Innovation (EFRI-2008), and NSF 06-596, and Computer Systems Research (CSR), NSF 07-
504. 
 Real Time Knowledge Discovery (RTKD) is a proposed call that will focus on the following: 
finding and learning patterns, RT pattern discovery of streaming data, RT Classification and 
Identification, RT Link Analysis, RT analysis of heterogeneous data, RT social network analysis, 
online learning as data arrives, explanation , RT federated identity search, near RT secondary 
search, answers always ready, data reliability, RT data cleaning, RT tools for information 
mapping across heterogeneous data into uniform representation, RT data enhancing, building 
models for testing, and RT adaptive question trees. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
In August, DARPA’s Strategic Technology Office (STO) released the Scalable Network 
Monitoring Broad Agency Announcement (BAA). The objective of this BAA is to stimulate 
research in network monitoring technologies that would scale linearly in cost and computation 
time to the size of the networks being monitored. Currently, cost/computation time scaling is 
exponentially larger than the network grow rate. Respondents were encouraged to seek 
algorithms that did not rely on traditional signature based or heuristics based methods for 
intrusion detection and network monitoring. 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
In 2006, the Office of Naval Research issued a Multi-University Research Initiative (MURI) topic 
Trust Management in Service Oriented Architectures. The purpose of this MURI was to develop 
mathematical principles for ensuring trust. In addition, the ONR has sponsored University 
Research Initiatives (URIs) on critical asset and infrastructure protection (CIP). URI/CIP program 
research topics spanned a variety of areas from encrypted computing, to securing Java, to power 
based attacks for identifying cryptographic keys in secure hardware, and finally to investigations 
of the spread of viruses in computer networks.  
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Intelligence Community (IC) 
The intelligence community has long regarded cyber-security as a top priority. Naturally, a 
significant portion of research in cryptology and cryptanalysis has been sponsored within this 
community. Recent efforts include the National Intelligence Community Enterprise Cyber 
Assurance Program (NICECAP). This program was focused on two specific areas: Accountable 
Information Flow and Large Scale System Defense. Accountable information flow was concerned 
with the problem of managing the flow of information in document form from user-to-user 
throughout a large enterprise. Problems to be addressed including automated classification and 
declassification, monitoring of user contributions, user access restrictions, and control of 
accidental or intentional leakage of classified or sensitive electronic information. Defense of 
Large Scale Systems was a more classical program focused on the defense of a large enterprise 
from a number of cyber-attacks. 
IC – XYZ –Real-Time Knowledge Discovery 
Acceleration of Search: The speed and rate of convergence on meaningful results for searches 
and other queries is the primary interest. Exploring enhancement of search algorithms, data 
representation schemes, clustering technologies, and other potential opportunities to enhance 
search is an important R&D priority. 
 Dynamic Question Streaming: Dynamically generate questions for interviewers  
Deception detection: Develop algorithms to model and predict the likelihood that a subject is 
seeking to deceive an interviewer.  
Anomaly detection: Identify, detect, and characterize anomalies in the data presented by an 
interviewee and/or data. 
Human Computer Interaction Related: Research on enhanced models for human-computer 
interaction in the interview-support process. 
Evidence Validation & Data Confidence: Research on enhanced models, algorithms, and 
methodologies to verify and validate evidence, including documentation of its source, accuracy 
and quality would support broader access to information that is relevant to interview support, as 
well as automation of information collection and validation. Similar research could be undertaken 
to enable data “confidence measurement.” 
IC – IARPA 
Topics of interest include knowledge discovery and data mining, knowledge discovery in 
databases, large-scale data mining, workflow, modeling and simulation, natural language 
processing, advanced video, multi-source visual pattern recognition, human-computer interface 
research, visualization, fusion of multi-INT information, cryptography, quantum information, 
cyber security research. 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
DHS has actively pursued cyber security research through its collaboration with NSF on the 
Cyber Trust program. In addition, they have been actively developing a Cyber Security Test Bed 
as well as looking at secure protocols for routing infrastructure, including the interaction of 
multiple Border Gateway Protocols (BGP). Finally, there has been significant work in the 
development of “large” datasets for information security testing. DHS is currently interested in 
new methods of insider threat detection, internet mapping, risk assessment for complex systems, 
cryptographic techniques, and other cyber security related research problems. Because of the 
nature of the DHS mission, they are most closely aligned with the goals and objectives of the 
Department of Energy in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
DHS – S&T 
The DHS S&T cyber security effort focuses on three areas: 
• Large Semantic Graph research and development 
• Cyber Security Testbed – secure protocols for routing information 
• Intrusion Detection, Internet Mapping, and Risk Assessment for Complex Systems. 
DHS S&T solicits research proposals through the Homeland Security Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (HSARPA), as described in http://www.hsarpabaa.com/index.asp. 
Cyber Security Research and Development (CSRD), HSARPA BAA 07-09, presents the 
following research goals: 
• To perform research and development (R&D) aimed at improving the security of existing 
deployed technologies, and to ensure the security of new emerging systems.  
• To develop new and enhanced technologies for the detection of, prevention of, and 
response to cyber attacks on the nation’s critical information infrastructure. To transfer 
these technologies into the national infrastructure as a matter of urgency. 
The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) is a consortium of experts who work 
together to identify and mitigate threats aimed at the U.S. information infrastructure; it operates 
as a “virtual national laboratory”, and is managed by Dartmouth College, with funding from DHS 
and other sources. Additional information about past projects is posted on www.thei3p.org . 
Considerations for Classified and Unclassified 
Programs: Research in a Mixed Environment 
A critical element for a DOE R&D agenda is the recognition that the problem space includes both 
classified and unclassified elements, and that the research community best suited to address these 
issues includes both cleared and uncleared personnel. A DOE R&D program must balance the 
competing need to obtain broad participation in the development and deployment of solutions 
with the need to protect national security. This issue has been faced by other agencies and can 
certainly be resolved. Our recommendation is that a forum or working meeting be convened, 
early in 2008, to focus on how the details of how a DOE program in this area might operate. 
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There are several considerations; a few of them are listed below: 
• How to identify an open research agenda that addresses areas of interest within the 
classified space without compromising the classified mission (e.g., without providing 
information about potential vulnerabilities). 
• How to scientifically validate work that is done entirely in the classified sphere. This may 
involve a cultural mind shift between traditional peer review in open science and the 
more compartmentalized view of research that tends to dominate in classified 
environments. 
• Synergistic activity around areas of mutual interest – such as high performance 
computing and high performance networking in such a way that both classified and open 
research efforts benefit. 
• Complementary and conflicting approaches and needs may exist – for instance, protocol 
analysis may be done for different reasons in open and classified space. One may need to 
emphasize performance, with security secondary or requiring less emphasis; the other 
may need to emphasize security, with performance secondary. 
• How to handle the transition from open to classified, and mitigate the negative effects on 
uncleared researchers who may feel disenfranchised. 
• Improved dissemination of research results and individual research activities in both the 
open and the classified communities; this is particularly important in the classified realm, 
but is also a need in the open space as well. It will also be necessary to facilitate ways to 
identify which researchers have clearances of appropriate levels to work on specific 
problems that require these, and to ensure that the pool of available researchers in this 
area is sufficient to support the research need. 
• Proper handling and peer review of proposals that include classified elements. 
• Managing the additional expense required for work that is conducted in a classified 
environment. 
• Managing a clear delineation between open and closed in a research project that spans 
both elements – how is this documented and monitored. 
• Indications of success or failure in a research project with classified elements may not be 
able to be communicated to the researchers working on the open elements, since 
success/failure parameters may be part of what is classified. 
Additional agencies that should be surveyed in more detail early in 2008: 
• NASA, due to the joint nature of their scientific and security-oriented missions  
• NSA has a long track record of funding both open and classified research as well 
• The “5 I” model for the Intelligence Community interactions with international 
counterparts 
• Law enforcement. 
Each of these has to meet the challenge of highly integrated missions, across both classifications 
and national boundaries.  
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We recommend that a forum or workshop meet to discuss further details, and that representatives 
from potential DOE collaborators, as well as agencies with similar needs, be invited to attend. 
These meetings should include both classified meetings as well as open meetings, possibly held at 
a shared location. It will be important for both the open and the classified communities take part 
in the development of this aspect of the program, since both are necessary for its success. 
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